La presencia de representantes de los trabajadores en los consejos de administración de las grandes empresas es un tema que encuentra en los últimos tiempos propuestas renovadas en el panorama internacional. No hace mucho publiqué una entrada referida a la propuesta de la Senadora Elizabeth Warren, que dentro de su Accountable Capitalism Act proponía que un porcentaje relevante de los consejeros de las grandes empresas (2/5) fuera elegido por los trabajadores.
Esa propuesta ha llevado a una revisión general de los esquemas fundamentales del modelo de gobierno societario que reconoce la primacía de los accionistas en la orientación de la gestión. Una revisión que excede de la presencia de los representantes de los trabajadores, puesto que junto a ella se apunta a la de otros grupos vinculados por la marcha de la sociedad. Pero en lo que afecta a los trabajadores, asistimos a argumentos favorables renovados, como los que sintetiza la entrada del Profesor Ewan McGaughey en el blog del Program on Corporate Governance de la Universidad de Harvard.
Si pasamos al Reino Unido, el pasado mes se ha hecho público un informe bajo el título A Better Future for Corporate Governance: Democratising Corporations for their Long-Term Success elaborado por encargo de algunos miembros del gabinete en la sombra del Partido Laborista, aunque se advierte en sus primeras páginas que el informe ni es un documento que exprese la línea política de dicho Partido, ni cuenta con el respaldo expreso de aquél.
El documento es interesante, puesto que propone una enmienda a la totalidad de algunos de los fundamentos del Derecho de sociedades británico, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la definición del corporate purpose dentro de la Companies Act de 2006 cuya reforma se propone. Su conocido artículo 172 merece atención singular, como refleja el párrafo que tomo del resúmen inicial:
“Directors’ duties contained in Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 should be amended so that shareholder interests are not placed above the interests of other stakeholders. The revised Section 172 could simply state that “A director of a company must act in the way s/he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its stakeholders as a whole”. Those stakeholders will include the employees, consumers, shareholders, pension scheme members, supply chains and the community more broadly. The revised directors’ duties will give recognition to the fact that large companies are public institutions with social obligations.”
El documento contiene aportaciones útiles, como la información comparada sobre la representación de los trabajadores en los distintos países europeos (pp. 55-60) o la exposición resumida de los diversos aspectos que deben tomarse en consideración en la opción entre la estructura monista o dualista del consejo de administración (pp. 61-63).
Como ya se ha puesto de manifiesto, el citado documento ofrece una lectura política del Derecho de sociedades que justifica cambios decisivos en su concepción tradicional. El enunciado básico de esos cambios reclama el abandono de la gestión atenta a los resultados a corto plazo y desplazar el poder de decisión desde los accionistas hacia otros grupos de stakeholders, cuyos intereses también deben ser respetados en la toma de decisiones que afecten a la continuidad de la sociedad o decisiones de relevancia como fusiones u OPAs.
Para ilustrar las principales opiniones contenidas en el documento me permitiré una transcripción parcial de las amplias conclusiones (pp. 52-54) del documento. Reitero que es una transcripción parcial, motivada por evidentes limitaciones de espacio y que solo la la lectura íntegra de esas conclusiones permitirá la correcta valoración de las mismas. Los autores del informe terminan formulando las siguientes conclusiones:
“The next Labour government will need to rebuild the UK economy for the benefit of all corporate stakeholders. (…) Short-termism is a major obstacle to rebuilding of the economy. It is embedded within the current shareholder-centric model of corporate governance and is routinely promoted by regulators and governments.
The consequences of short-termism are all too visible. Companies are being hollowed-out through obsessive increases in dividends and short-term returns to shareholders. The resulting squeeze on investment, research and development and reskilling is damaging the long term prosperity of companies and the country. The shareholder-centric model of corporate governance is dysfunctional and must be replaced by a focus on the long-term. Company executives also need to be called to account for their policies and practices. (…)
Companies are public bodies and must serve the interests of all stakeholders. That necessarily means empowering stakeholders with a long-term interest in companies. This paper argued that employees, consumers, pension schemes members and long-term shareholders have a vital interest in the long-term success of the company and must have representation on the boards of all large companies either through a unitary board or a two-tier board. This would enable employees, consumers and others to bring different perspectives on corporate decisions. Such practices are common in most European countries and have helped to build prosperous and stable companies and economies.
The empowerment of long-term stakeholders and reduced rights for short-term shareholders will enable executives to resist hostile takeover bids and pressures to provide short-tern returns. It is also a necessary step towards securing a more equitable distribution of income. The pressure to pay dividends will need to be balanced against the need for investment and growth. It would enable stakeholders to have greater say on executive pay, mergers and matters of long term importance.
This paper also called for changes to the duties of directors so that the long-term success of the company for the benefit of all stakeholders becomes the main objective. It rejected the voluntary codes of corporate governance and called for legal frameworks which give stakeholders enforceable rights. It called for the creation of a Companies Commission to monitor and enforce all aspects of good governance.
(…)
The proposals contained in this paper will not only democratise corporations they will also change the nature of a corporation and its relationship with society and stakeholders. Two of them are the control of hostile mergers and takeovers, and the reform of insolvency law.
Mergers and takeovers
(…)
The stakeholder approach advocated in this paper will change many aspects of mergers and takeovers fundamentally. Only long-term shareholders would be able to vote on mergers and takeovers, not short-term speculators seeking to turn a quick profit on the volatility that rumours of mergers and takeovers create. Importantly, the employees of the target company will also be able to vote on the desirability of that merger or takeover through their representatives on the respective stakeholder boards for their company, or they could be empowered to vote individually and directly. All stakeholders in large companies would have consultation rights and access to extensive information so that they can make informed judgements about the merits or demerits of a mooted takeover. There are tools in these proposals to prevent hostile takeovers from ruining viable businesses, from losing productive jobs, and from causing long-term harm to the economy. By empowering a broader range of stakeholders in a company to speak – in particular employees and long-term shareholders – we can change the approach to predatory mergers and takeovers.
(…) In future, mergers and takeovers must pass a ‘public interest’ test.
(…)
Insolvency
The practices of insolvency would also need to change. (…) Upon liquidation, most of the proceeds are passed to secured creditors (usually banks) who historically have been the first in the queue for distribution. Little is left for unsecured creditors and many innocent businesses are driven ought of business. Insolvency law must be reformed so as to protect small businesses. The order of liquidation distribution has long been established and is unfair in that one stakeholder (secured creditor) can collect most of the liquidation proceeds whilst others get little. (…) Simply put, instead of all of the assets being passed to the secured creditors, a pool of assets would be reserved to protect the unsecured creditors.
(…) ”.
Madrid, 9 de octubre de 2018